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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 13-1266 
___________ 
 
IN RE:  CAROLE L. TAYLOR, 
 Appellant 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil No. 2:12-cv-01846) 
District Judge:  Honorable Arthur J. Schwab 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Summary Action Pursuant to  
Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
May 16, 2013 
 
Before:  FUENTES, FISHER and VANASKIE, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: May 24, 2013) 
_________ 
 
OPINION 
_________ 
 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Carole Taylor, proceeding pro se, appeals from the District Court’s January 10, 
2013 order, which denied her requests for recusal and a stay, and dismissed her 
bankruptcy appeal for lack of jurisdiction.  For the reasons that follow, we will 
summarily affirm. 
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I. 
 Since 2010, Taylor has been embroiled in various proceedings in the United States 
Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania.  In 2011, Ronda Winnecour, 
the Chapter 13 Trustee who has been involved in those proceedings, filed an adversarial 
action in the Bankruptcy Court against Taylor and other defendants.  On October 24, 
2012, the Bankruptcy Court dismissed that action as moot in light of a settlement 
agreement approved earlier that year. 
 Taylor, believing that she had been wronged, appealed from the Bankruptcy 
Court’s October 24, 2012 decision.  Although the deadline for appealing from that 
decision was November 7, 2012, see 28 U.S.C. § 158(c)(2); Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8002(a), 
Taylor did not file her notice of appeal until November 21, 2012.  Thereafter, Winnecour 
moved to dismiss the appeal, arguing, inter alia, that the appeal was untimely.  Taylor, 
meanwhile, moved to recuse the presiding District Judge – the Honorable Arthur J. 
Schwab – and also filed a “Motion Urgent Open Certain for Supercedeas [sic] Injunction 
(Stay),” requesting “an Immediate STAY Pending appeal.”  On January 10, 2013, the 
District Court denied Taylor’s motions and granted Winnecour’s motion to dismiss.  In 
doing so, the District Court concluded that Taylor’s notice of appeal was untimely and 
that, as a result, the court lacked jurisdiction to consider her appeal. 
 Taylor now seeks review of the District Court’s judgment. 
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II. 
 We have jurisdiction over Taylor’s appeal from the District Court’s judgment 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 158(d) and 1291.  We exercise de novo review over the District 
Court’s determination that it lacked jurisdiction to consider her bankruptcy appeal.  See 
In re Caterbone, 640 F.3d 108, 111 (3d Cir. 2011).  We review the District Court’s denial 
of her motion to recuse, as well as that court’s denial of her stay motion, for abuse of 
discretion.  See Securacomm Consulting, Inc. v. Securacom Inc., 224 F.3d 273, 278 (3d 
Cir. 2000) (reciting standard for reviewing denial of recusal motion); Jackson v. Danberg, 
656 F.3d 157, 162 (3d Cir. 2011) (reciting standard for reviewing denial of stay motion). 
 For substantially the reasons provided by the District Court, the denial of Taylor’s 
motion to recuse did not constitute an abuse of discretion.  Furthermore, Taylor has not 
demonstrated that the District Court abused its discretion when it denied her motion for a 
stay.  Finally, for substantially the reasons provided by the District Court, we agree that 
Taylor’s bankruptcy appeal was untimely and that, as a result, the District Court lacked 
jurisdiction to consider it.  See Caterbone, 640 F.3d at 111-12 (citing, inter alia, 28 
U.S.C. § 158(c)(2) and Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 209 (2007)).  That jurisdictional 
defect bars not only the District Court, but also us, from reviewing the merits of Taylor’s 
bankruptcy appeal.  See Caterbone, 640 F.3d at 113. 
 Because Taylor’s appeal from the District Court’s judgment does not present a 
substantial question, we will summarily affirm that judgment.  See 3d Cir. I.O.P. 10.6. 
